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COMMENTARY
EQUAL PROTECTION AGAINST UNNECESSARY POLICE VIOLENCE
AND THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: A COMMENT
ALFRED AviNs*
T HE recent and widespread allegations of unnecessary police violence at the
1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago1 has focused attention
on the federal remedies to cure such outbreaks when local authorities are
either indifferent or even sympathetic to police excesses. Such local apathy is
often found when the object of police violence is an unpopular or minority
social, political, or ethnic group. 2 Federal indictments for police brutality,
oppression, or nonfeasance, envisaged in Screws v. United States,3 are few and
far between. 4 The difficulties of proving police misconduct beyond a reasonable
doubt are formidable.5 Even civil damage actions under the authority of Mon-
roe v. PapeG are often more of a scarecrow than a real deterrent. Many police-
men are judgment-proof.7 In addition, evidence is frequently difficult for the
unaided would-be litigant to ferret out. A person being beaten by a police
officer, whether on the street or in a station house, may be too preoccupied to
calmly secure pencil and paper and take the names of witnesses. Those wit-
nesses who are brother officers are unlikely to divulge their identities volun-
* B.A. 1954, Hunter College; LL.B. 1956, Columbia University; LL.M. 1957, New
York University; M.L. 1961, J.S.D. 1962, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1965, Cambridge
University. Former Assistant District Attorney, New York County.
1. D. WALER, RiGHTS 3N CoN'=icT: TE VIOLENT CONFRONTATION OF DEMONSTRATORS
=D POLICE IN THE PARxs AND STREETs oF CHICAGo DURNMG THE WEEK OF THmE DEocRATIc
NATIONAL CONVENTION oF 1968 (1968), a report submitted to the National Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence. This article is not meant to prejudge the events in
Chicago as to whether any unnecessary police violence did in fact exist. See criticism of
Daniel Walker by Chief Judge William J. Campbell of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1968, at 1, col. 4; id., Dec. 10, 1968,
at 26, col. 1.
2. A good example of this occurred in New Jersey. A federal grand jury indicted eight
Paterson policemen for assaulting a Negro, breaking windows in stores operated by Negroes,
failing to protect premises occupied by a "civil rights" group, and failing to report these
incidents. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1968, at 1, col. 7. Many citizens called police headquarters
offering contributions to aid in the defense of the police; policemen themselves were glum
or angry about the indictment; and the police chief refused to recommend suspension of
the indicted men. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1968, at 42, col. 1. When the mayor voted against
suspension of the men, 50 off-duty policemen applauded. It was pointed out that three
policemen indicted for burglary had previously been suspended. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1968,
at 28, col. 6.
3. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
4. The indictment against the Paterson police was the first in many years. Supra, n.2.
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1969, p. 76, col. 1 (patrolman acquitted of beating
student).
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. When I was an Assistant District Attorney of New York Cunty, policemen uni-.
formly told me that they put all of their property in their wives' names to make any judg-
ments against them uncoliectable.
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tarily, for the tendency of policemen to close ranks in brutality cases is well
known.8
PROTECTION AGAINST POLICE VIOLENCE
According to the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment,
toleration by state or local authorities of police brutality is a violation of the
equal protection clause. Protection against violence was one of the chief aims
of the framers. The necessity for federal action was indelibly implanted in the
minds of northern anti-slavery men by the notorious Hoar incident. In Novem-
ber, 1844, former Representative Samuel Hoar, a prominent Massachusetts
lawyer, was sent by that state's officials to Charleston, South Carolina, to test
the constitutionality of a South Carolina law which compelled the imprison-
ment of free Negro seamen who visited the state as part of the crew of a
Massachusetts-owned ship. His visit aroused great public excitement, and he was
threatened with mob violence. The state authorities refused or failed to protect
him, and he was ultimately expelled from Charleston without bringing the law-
suit.9 This incident caused much indignation in the North, and northern mem-
bers of Congress taxed southerners with it frequently before the Civil War.10
It remained in the minds of the Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress who proposed the fourteenth amendment. Senator John Sherman of
Ohio said: "In the celebrated case of Mr. Hoar, who went to South Carolina,
he was driven out, although he went there to exercise a plain constitutional
right, and although he was a white man of undisputed character."' 1 Repre-
sentative John A. Bingham of Ohio, who drafted the equal protection clause,
proposed to introduce this provision because the original Constitution "was
utterly disregarded in the past by South Carolina when she drove with indig-
nity and contempt and scorn from her limits the honored representative of
Massachusetts who went thither upon the peaceful mission of asserting in the
tribunals of South Carolina the rights of American citizens."12
Bingham was concerned with the fact that violence was going undeterred
because politically unpopular groups, both white and black, were not getting
equal and exact justice.1 3 He believed that the privileges and immunities clause
of the original Constitution required states to protect citizens in their life,
liberty, and property, but that state officials had been remiss in this obligation.1 4
8. The Detroit Police Officers Association recently sued the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission to enjoin the Commission from ordering the Detroit Police Department to
discipline officers for beating and harassing a Negro gasoline station attendant. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 15, 1968, at 74, col. 5.
9. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1598 (1856) (remarks of Rep. Comins);
13 ENCYcLOPEDIA BTANmcA 542 (11th ed. 1910); BIoGRAIPHicA DICTIONARY OF TnE
AaRicAN CONGRESS, 1774-1927, at 1103 (1928).
10. See CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 1154-55, 1556, app. 575, app. 1012-13 (1854).
11. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Seas. 41 (1866).
12. Id. at 158.
13. Id. at 157.
14. Id. at 2542-43.
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Accordingly, his object was to give federal courts power to make certain that
state officials performed their duty of protection.15 Other Republicans in Con-
gress echoed his desire to see that state officials protected all citizens, including
politically unpopular individuals from other states, against violence. 16
From the earliest jurisprudence of this country, every individual was
deemed to be entitled to "protection of the laws."1 7 The framers of the four-
teenth amendment believed that government afforded such protection when it
accorded to aggrieved individuals the established criminal and civil remedies
for infringements on the rights of life, liberty, personal security, and property.
The presence of these remedies served as a deterrent to wrongdoers who would
otherwise be free to inflict injury or damage without fear of punishment or a
requirement to pay compensation.'$ These rights were deemed in 1866 to be
the "civil rights" of citizens.19
The equal protection clause was designed to make these remedies equally
available to all persons. It protected the right to sue20 and to be a witness in
civil and criminal proceedings,21 because the latter right was necessary to
obtain relief in court. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the forerunner of the
first section of the fourteenth amendment, gave all citizens the "full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.) 22
The Enforcement Act of 1870,23 the first statute passed by the framers to
enforce the equal protection clause, extended this benefit to aliens, a provision
made necessary by denial of remedies to Chinese on the West Coast. 24 Repre-
sentative Thaddeus Stevens, Chairman on the part of the House of Represen-
tatives of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and leader of the House
Radical Republicans, in his opening speech reporting the fourteenth amend-
ment, explained:
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford 'equal' protection
to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall
15. Id. at 158.
16. I have collected materials from the debates on this point in Avins, Fourteenth
Amendment Limitations on Banning Racial Discrimination: The Original Understanding,
8 ApIz. L. REv. 236, 239-49 (1967).
17. See Marshall, C.J. in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 163 (1803): "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of govern-
ment is to afford that protection." See also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (No.
3230) (ED. Pa. 1823).
18. The relevant debate is collected in Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the Laws:
The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y. LAW FoRvmr 385 (1966).
19. See the remarks of Representative James F. Wilson, of Iowa, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, in opening the debate on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. CoNG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866).
20. Avins, The Right to Bring Suit Under the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original
Understanding, 20 OxrA. L. Rav. 284 (1967).
21. Avins, The Right to Be a Witness and the Fourteenth Amendment, 31 Mo. L. Rv.
471 (1966).
22. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 209-11 (1866); 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
23. 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
24. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536, 3658 (1870) (remarks of Senator Stewart).
See also Avins, supra, n.16, at 249-52.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in
court shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are great
advantages over their present codes.2 5
Nothing in the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment exempts
police brutality from the scope of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, if
a protection afforded by law against unnecessary police violence exists for one
person, it must be made equally available to all.
DIscIPLINARY PROCEDURES AS PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
As previously noted, civil and criminal remedies against police officers who
use unnecessary force are equally available to all, but are often of doubtful
utility or efficacy. A more potent remedy is disciplinary proceedings which
may result in such penalties as forfeiture of pay, demotion, or even dismissal
from the police force. Such penalties are most feared by erring police officers
because they are, when diligently applied, swift, sure, and substantial. More-
over, police disciplinary boards have the full benefit of police department co-
operation, which often enables them to ferret out evidence which would be un-
available to a private litigant or even a prosecuting attorney. Police disciplinary
boards are not bound by the technical rules of evidence applicable in court, 20
and the courts will sustain the imposition of discipline based on police expertise
applied to facts which might be insufficient to warrant a criminal conviction
or even possibly a civil judgment for the same misconduct. 7 The chances that
a policeman guilty of brutality will escape penalty from a conscientious dis-
ciplinary board is much less than the chances that he will escape from a criminal
or civil court.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
26. Keith v. Civil Service Bd., 57 Ariz. 85, 111 P.2d 57 (1941); Jenkins v. Curry,
154 Fla. 617, 18 So. 2d 521 (1944) ; Stowers v. City of Atlanta, 79 Ga. App. 568, 54 S.E.2d
340 (1949); Doyle v. Kammeraad, 310 Mich. 233, 17 N.W.2d 165 (1945); Aller v. Detroit
Police Dept. Trial Bd., 309 Mich. 382, 15 N.W.2d 676 (1944); Evans v. Monaghan, 306
N.Y. 312, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954); Roge v. Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268, 20 N.E.2d 751 (1939);
Slessinger v. Fairley, 340 Pa. 273, 16 A.2d 710 (1940).
27. See n.26, supra. See also Skaags v. Horrall, 83 Cal. App. 2d 424, 188 P.2d 774
(1948); Riley v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 147 Conn. 113, 157 A.2d 590 (1960); Davis v.
Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 37 Ill. App. 2d 158, 185 N.E.2d 281 (1962); Taylor v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 33 Ill. App. 2d 48, 178 N.E.2d 200 (1961); Hammers v. Board of
Fire & Police Comm'rs, 10 Il. App. 2d 218, 134 N.E.2d 647 (1956); Oratowski v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 3 Ill. App. 2d 551, 123 N.E.2d 146 (1954); Zellers v. City of South Bend,
221 Ind. 452, 48 N.E.2d 816 (1943); Nuss v. New Orleans Police Dept., 149 So. 2d 656
(La. App. 1963); Bernius v. New Orleans Police Dept., 135 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1961);
Marchese v. New Orleans Police Dept., 226 La. 982, 77 So. 2d 742 (1955); Konen v. New
Orleans Police Dept., 226 La. 739, 77 So. 2d 24 (1954); Purdie v. Detroit Police Dept.
Trial Bd., 318 Mich. 430, 28 N.W.2d 283 (1947); Hughes v. Department of Public Safety,
200 Min. 16, 273 N.W. 618 (1937); Johnson v. Priest, 398 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App. 1965);
O'Shea v. Martin, 34 Misc. 2d 987, 230 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1962); Machiano v. Adams, 286 App.
Div. 1007, 145 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1955); Mack v. Cramer, 285 App. Div. 925, 137 N.Y.S.2d 435
(1955); Smith v. Valentine, 282 N.Y. 351, 26 N.E.2d 288 (1940); Howland v. Thomas,
98 R.I. 470, 204 A.2d 640 (1964); Carlson v. McLyman, 77 R.I 177, 74 A.2d 853 (1950);
Erkman v. Civil Service Comm'n, 114 Utah 228, 198 P.2d 238 (1948) ; Petition of Heffernan,
244 Wis. 104, 11 N.W.2d 680 (1943).
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The uniform rule in the United States is that a policeman who uses un-
necessary force against a citizen is guilty of misconduct in his employment
and is subject to disciplinary action or dismissal.2 8 It is interesting to note that
the rule is the same in India.2 9 As early as 1817 the Nizamut Adawlut of Cal-
cutta held that a police supervisor who orders a man of seventy beaten may be
dismissed as unfit. 3 The Sudder Foujdaree Adawlut of Bombay has held that a
policeman who procured others to force a person he suspected of using witch-
craft to drink stagnant water and undergo an ordeal by fire was guilty of mis-
conduct.3 1 The Chief Court of Lower Burma has decided that slapping a sus-
pect for refusing to answer a question is a violation of duty,32 while the
Supreme Court of Ceylon made the same ruling where a policeman handcuffed
a prisoner unnecessarily. 33
The rule in Illinois is no different.L3 4 A police officer may be dismissed
under police regulations for conduct unbecoming an officer if he maltreats a
citizen.3 5 It has been held that a police officer is subject to disciplinary action
if he strikes a person unnecessarily with a club, even if he is making a lawful
arrest for disorderly conduct. 6 The Illinois Appellate Court has likewise ruled
that a Chicago police officer may be dismissed for -assaulting a citizen even
though the latter addressed insolent language to the officer, since such language
did not justify maltreatment of the citizenYm The Supreme Court of Illinois has
decided that Chicago Police Department disciplinary regulations have the force
and effect of law,3 8 and that "the discharge of a police officer for conduct un-
28. Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo, 33 Cal. 2d 867, 206 P.2d 355 (1949); City of
Anderson v. Hadley, 122 Ind. App. 8, 102 N.E.2d 385 (1951); State ex rel. Boynton v.
Jackson, 139 Kan. 744, 33 P.2d 118 (1934); Cornett v. Chandler, 307 S.W.2d 918 (Ky.
1957); Long v. Daly, 6 N.J. Misc. 495, 141 At. 787 (N.J. Super. 1928), aff'd 105 N.J.L.
492, 144 AtI. 588 (E. & A. 1929) ; Marran v. Common Council, 61 Atl. 13 (N.J. Sup. 1905) ;
People v. Partridge, 88 App. Div. 60, 84 N.Y.S. 779 (1903); People v. McLean, 60 Hun.
584, 15 N.Y.S. 219 (1891); People v. Bell, 57 Hun. 590, 10 N.Y.S. 829 (1890); People v.
French, 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 108 (1888); People v. Carroll, 42 Hun. 438 (N.Y. 1886); Appeal
of Bettero, 65 Pa. D. & C. 363 (1948); Harless v. Bichsel, 327 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959); Allen v. Herrera, 257 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See also People v.
Jourdan, 90 N.Y. 53 (1882). See generally, Annot., 100 A.L.R. 1394 (1936); Note, 33 McH.
L. REv. 450 (1935).
29. See A. AviNs, E pLOYEES' MISCONDUCT AS CAUSE rOR DiSciLns AND DSSSAL,
IN INDrA AND TnE ComuoNwEALTH 44, 605-6 (1968), where I have collected a large number
of Indian cases on this point.
30. Ram Bux Hujam v. Mahtab Ra, 1 MacNaughton 341 (1817).
31. Cowusjee Muncherjee's Case, 9 Morris 458 (1858).
32. Queen-Empress v. Nga Shwe 0 (1881), 1 Moyle's Lower Burma Criminal Circulars
533, (1872-1891J, Lower Burma Rul. 150, Selected Judgments, Lower Burma 150 (2d Ed.
1907).
33. Police Ct. Case, Kurunegala, No. 12,936, Vanderstraaten 51 (Ceylon Sup. Ct. 1870).
34. See Coane v. Geary, 298 Ill. App. 199, 18 N.E.2d 719 (1939).
35. Olsen v. Civil Service Comm'n, 28 Ill. App. 2d 146, 171 N.E.2d 80 (1960) (draw-
ing pistol without provocation).
36. Kulczyk v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 344 Ill. App. 555, 101 N.E.2d 626
(1951).
37. Oratowski v. Civil Service Comm'n, 3 Ill. App. 2d 551, 123 N.E.2d 146 (1955).
Accord, Edwards v. Civil Service Comm'n, 227 Iowa 74, 287 N.W. 285 (1939).
38. Harrison v. Civil Service Comm'n, 1 Ill. 2d 137, 115 N.E.2d 521 (1953).
--603
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becoming a member of the department is not only for the purpose of punishing
the officer, but for the protection of the public." 39
Moreover, an Illinois statute which requires that a police officer who is
guilty of oppression, malconduct, or misfeasance in the discharge of his duties
must be removed from office4 ° has been held to be designed for the protection
of the public.41 As the Illinois Appellate Court observed: "Discipline . . is
vital or this force of armed men can become a haven for bullies officially armed
with guns. ... "4
It appears from the foregoing analysis that statutes and police department
disciplinary regulations which are the equivalent of laws for the department
are designed to protect the public against police violence. They are a protec-
tion afforded by the law for the security of citizens against police misconduct
and therefore constitute the "protection of the laws" which must be accorded
equally to all persons who come within the jurisdiction of the state. The fact
that such tribunals are relatively new innovations in most jurisdictions, does
not remove them from the scope of the fourteenth amendment. The Constitution
covers every protection afforded by law, whether in existence in 1866 or newly
devised. The principles of the equal protection clause cannot vary, and as long
as the police disciplinary tribunal comes within the legal theory of the fourteenth
amendment as originally understood, the amendment covers it just as if specif-
ically named by the framers. Any superior police official or city official whose
duty or functi6n it is to invoke disciplinary procedures where policemen
commit misconduct, and who unjustifiably refuses or fails to invoke such pro-
cedures when a case of police brutality is brought to his attention, has denied
the equal protection of the laws to the person who was the victim of the
brutality.
OFFICIAL INACTION AS A DENIAL OF PROTECTION
It may be argued that superior city officials and police superiors who fail
to invoke disciplinary procedures in police brutality cases cannot themselves
be amenable to federal penalties because they have done nothing personally.
It may be said that they are guilty only of inaction, and that under the
reasoning of The Civil Rights Cases43 the "state action" requirement has not
been satisfied. This reasoning will not withstand close analysis. The Civil Rights
Cases held that where a state passes no law for the protection of any person,
Congress cannot step in and affirmatively impose duties on private businesses
as an enforcement of the equal protection clause. This author has no doubt
39. Id. at 145, 115 NYE.2d at 529. Accord, DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm'n, 31 Ill. 2d
482, 488, 202 N.E.2d 522, 526 (1964).
40. ILL. REv. STAT. 1953, C. 38, § 449 (1963); ILL. ANt. STAT. cb. 24, § 9-92 (Smith-
Hurd 1969).
41. People v. Niewinski, 13 Ill. App. 2d 307, 142 N.E.2d 151 (1957).
42. Nolting v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 162, 129 N.E.2d 236, 244
(1955).43. 109 UI.S. 3 (1883).
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of the correctness of this interpretation of the fourteenth amendment," but
giving this principle of law its widest scope, it has no application to police
discipline.
The Supreme Court decided in The Civil Rights Cases that where a state
had no statute or law affording protection to anyone, its constitutional duty
of protecting everybody equally had been satisfied. This is unquestionably
correct. Where nobody gets any protection, the amount of protection afforded
to all by law is exactly equal, since everybody gets nothing.4 5 Applying this to
police discipline, if a policeman of the City of Chicago had a legal right to beat
the mayor over the head with a club, and still remain on the police force, with-
out being disciplined, he has the same right in the case of any other citizen.
But it is questionable whether such a police officer would remain on the force
very long after such an incident. As previously noted, Illinois has passed laws
and regulations protecting the mayor against police brutality by imposing dis-
ciplinary penalties for such actions. Doubtless they would be invoked in a
case of brutality against the mayor; hence, all other citizens are constitutionally
entitled to the same degree of legal protection. In other words, a state may
withhold its protection from all, but once its laws afford protection, the "state
action" requirement is satisfied and that protection must be made equally avail-
able to all.
This proposition is clearly supported by the original understanding and
intent of the Republican framers of the fourteenth amendment. For example,
Representative James A. Garfield, the Ohio lawyer who later became President
of the United States, observed:
44. I have previously discussed the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
which was involved in the Civil Rights Cases and have concluded that the Supreme Court
came to the right result, although some parts of the majority opinion are not an accurate
reflection of the intent of the framers of the statute. See Avins, The Civil Rights Act of
1875; Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations,
66 CoLrmr. L. REv. 873 (1966); Avins, What is a Place of "Public" Accommodation? 52
MARQ. L. Rav. 1 (1968); Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875 and The Civil Rights Cases
Revisited: State Action, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Housing, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 5
(1966).
45. A good example of this point are the statutes abolishing "heart-balm," such as
the tort of alienation of a spouse's affections. Under common law, every married person was
protected by law against third persons who alienated the affection of his or her spouse. The
protection which the law gave was a remedy in tort for damages, which tended to deter
third persons from breaking up the marriage. If the law of a state had given this remedy
only to white persons, or only to Christians, or only to citizens, it would have denied to all
persons within the state's jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws against alienation of a
spouse's affections. But since all married persons had a right to sue in tort, all were equally
protected, and still are in states which retain the common law. However, some states
have abolished the tort of alienation of affections. In such states, a third person is now
legally privileged to break up a marriage without fear of deterrence by law, and no spouse
is protected against this conduct. Nevertheless, from a constitutional point of view, every
spouse has equal protection of the laws even though no one is protected. Accordingly,
abolition of "heart-balm" is constitutional. See Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d
815 (1936); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 617 (1945). Contra, Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d
464 (1946), decided on other grounds. See generally, Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart-
Balm," 33 MICa. L. Rav. 979 (1935).
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It is not required that the laws of a State shall be perfect. They
may be unwise, injudicious, even unjust; but they must be equal in
their provisions, like the air of heaven, covering all and resting upon
all with equal weight. The laws must not only be equal on their face,
but they must be so administered that equal protection under them
shall not be denied to any class of citizens, either by the courts or
the executive officers of the State.
It may be pushing the meaning of the words beyond their natural
limits, but I think the provision that the States shall not 'deny the
equal protection of the laws' implies that they shall afford equal
protection.46
Garfield's scholarly colleague, Representative William Lawrence, a former state
judge, took the same position.47 Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont, Chair-
man of the Senate Judiciary Committee, declared:
[It] does not say that no State shall pass any law which shall deny
to its citizens and those of the United States the equal protection
of its equal laws, but it says that no State shall deny it, by which
I understand, as English jurists and English history have understood
for a thousand years when the very same language was used in Magna
Carta, that we will not deny to our subjects, the equal protection and
redress of the laws, that it imports an affirmative duty to see to it
that an equal and a real protection to every citizen within these borders
is accorded and vindicated. 48
Finally, Senator James F. Wilson of Iowa, who had been Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee in 1866, stated that "neglect to enforce laws
enacted to assure such equal protection is a denial of it."140
The intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment was that if a
private person inflicted personal injury or property damage on another private
person and the state had laws redressing such injury, a state official who
refused or failed to afford such redress was himself liable to federal jurisdiction
for denying the equal protection of the laws to the victim. In such a case the
state official was liable, not for the initial injury on any theory of vicarious
liability, but for his own dereliction in failing to afford the constitutional right
of equal protection.50 Under section five of the fourteenth amendment, Con-
46. CONG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 153 (1871).
47. He said: "The word 'deny' must include an omission by any State to enforce or
secure the equal rights designed to be protected. There are sins of omission as well as com-
mission. A State which omits to secure the rights denies them." 2 CONG. RPc. 412 (1874).
See also id. at 341.
48. 8 CONG. Rlc. 960 (1879). He also said: "[Ilt was the belief .. .of those who
framed and passed these amendments . .. that every citizen within the borders of that
State should have equal and fair security under the law, not only as a written proposition
but as a real fact." Id.
49. 15 CONG. Rac. 135 (1883).
go. Avins, Federal Power to Punish Individual Crime Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: the Original Understanding, 43 NoraR DA= LAw. 317 (1968); Avins, The Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment,
11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 331 (1967).
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gress has enforced the equal protection clause by providing a remedy in federal
court for persons who have been denied protection by state officials. 51
In the case of police brutality, the equal protection clause requires that
superior police officials and superior city officials make available to the aggrieved
party the same disciplinary procedures that would be available to them if they
were the victims. If they fail to do so, they are amenable to federal remedies,
not for the brutality on any theory of respondeat superior, but for their own
fault in refusing to accord equal protection of the police disciplinary laws to
the injured person. Of course, if it appears that the evidence is insufficient, or
there was justification for police action, or other good reason for not invoking
disciplinary procedures, then the superior officials have performed their duty
and no federal cause of action lies against them. But a uniform standard must
be applied to all. A sluperior official who justifies plainly indefensible police
conduct because he does not like the victims cannot absolve himself of his per-
sonal responsibility by invoking a discretionary power. His discretion is circum-
scribed by the constitutional mandate.
Moreover, each superior official in the chain of police command is respon-
sible to the victim. If one layer of officialdom will not move, the aggrieved
person may appeal to the next higher layer, and so on along the line until the
police superintendent and the mayor are informed of the facts. Each official
up the ladder who unjustifiably refuses to set appropriate disciplinary machinery
in motion makes himself liable to a federal remedy for refusing the same pro-
tection against police violence he would normally give in other cases.
The foregoing rule, far from being either novel or extraordinary, is exactly
what the framer of the equal protection clause contemplated. On March 9, 1866,
Representative Bingham stated his purpose as follows:
[The] care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen,
under the solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your Federal Con-
stitution, is in the States, and not in the Federal Government. I have
sought to effect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the
country. I have advocated here an amendment which would arm Con-
gress with the power to compel obedience to the oath, and punish all
violations by State officers of the bill of rights, but leaving those offi-
cers to discharge the duties enjoined upon them as citizens of the
United States by that oath and by that Constitution .... I may bor-
row the words . . . as truly descriptive of the American system:
'centralized government, decentralized administration.' That, sir,
coupled with your declared purpose of equal justice, is the secret of
your strength and power. 52
Every police official and every city official, from the lowest to the highest,
takes a personal oath to support the Constitution of the United States. Every
such official has a personal obligation to keep that promise. Any official who
51. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, sec. 1, 17 Stat. 13, now 42 U.S.C. sec.
1983. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
52. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866).
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refuses to enforce the constitutional mandate of equal protection has broken
his oath and made himself amenable to federal jurisdiction on account of his
own personal dereliction. There is nothing unjust about making him respond
for his own fault. The higher the official, the graver is his breach of his official
oath and the more necessary is the remedy. Importance of position is not a
shield against dereliction of federally-imposed duty.
CONCLUSION
The vast majority of police officers are able, conscientious, and law-abiding
as well as law-enforcing. This is equally true of superior police and city offi-
cials. A few bad apples, however, tend to crop up in every barrel. These must
be cast out lest they contaminate the rest and brutalize the police force. For
police officers and superior officials to close ranks in brutality cases and shield
the offender must ultimately drive a wedge between the citizenry and the police,
as well as corroding the police itself. The fourteenth amendment, equally with
sound public policy, forbids any such concession to unnecessary police violence.
